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Abstract—Undetectable wireless transmissions are fundamen-
tal to avoid eavesdroppers or censorship by authoritarian gov-
ernments. To address this issue, wireless steganography “hides”
covert information inside primary information by slightly mod-
ifying the transmitted waveform such that primary information
will still be decodable, while covert information will be seen as
noise by agnostic receivers. Since the addition of covert informa-
tion inevitably decreases the SNR of the primary transmission,
a key challenge in wireless steganography is to mathematically
analyze and optimize the impact of the covert channel on the
primary channel as a function of different channel conditions.
Another core issue is to make sure that the covert channel is
almost undetectable by eavesdroppers. Existing approaches are
protocol-specific and thus their performance cannot be assessed
and optimized in general scenarios. To address this research gap,
we notice that existing wireless technologies rely on phase-keying
modulations (e.g., BPSK, QPSK) that in most cases do not use
the channel up to its Shannon capacity. Therefore, the residual
capacity can be leveraged to implement a wireless system based
on a pseudo-noise asymmetric shift keying (PN-ASK) modulation,
where covert symbols are mapped by shifting the amplitude of pri-
mary symbols. This way, covert information will be undetectable,
since a receiver expecting phase-modulated symbols will see their
shift in amplitude as an effect of channel/path loss degradation.
Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we first investigate the
SER of PN-ASK as a function of the channel; then, we find the
optimal PN-ASK parameters that optimize primary and covert
throughput under different channel condition. We evaluate the
throughput performance and undetectability of PN-ASK through
extensive simulations and on an experimental testbed based on
USRP N210 software-defined radios. Results indicate that PN-
ASK improves the throughput by more than 8x with respect to
prior art. Finally, we demonstrate through experiments that PN-
ASK is able to transmit covert data on top of IEEE 802.11g frames,
which are correctly decoded by an off-the-shelf laptop WiFi card
without any hardware modifications.
Index Terms—Steganography, Wireless Communications, Un-
detectability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing undetectable wireless communications is of
paramount importance not only in military and tactical set-
tings; but also when the freedom and security of individuals
is undermined by censorship or malicious entities. Since radio
This paper has been accepted for publication in IEEE INFOCOM 2019. This
is a preprint version of the accepted paper. Copyright (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal
use of this material is permitted. However, permission to use this material for
any other purposes must be obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to
pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
waveforms are broadcast and cannot be hidden, a fundamental
issue is how to conceal a wireless transmission behind another.
To this end, steganography (from the Greek word στγανo´ς ,
meaning “covered, concealed, or protected”) allows to “hide”
covert information behind intelligible (also called primary) data
[1], such that the covert information is disguised as noise to
receivers oblivious to the covert data exchange [2].
The application of steganographic techniques to wireless
communications has received significant attention over the last
years [3–10]. Among others, prior work creates covert channels
by encoding information on top of the training sequences of
WiFi [11], the cyclic prefix of WiFi OFDM symbols [4], errors
introduced in the Bluetooth direct-sequence spread spectrum
[9], and a “dirty” WiFi QPSK constellation [3]. However, exist-
ing approaches present a number of core limitations, which are
discussed in details in Section II. Most importantly, since any
steganographic technique will necessarily decrease the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of the primary channel, we need to thor-
oughly investigate and optimize through rigorous mathematical
analysis the primary and covert symbol error rate (SER) as a
function of the wireless channel. However, prior approaches are
tied to specific wireless technologies (i.e., WiFi and Bluetooth),
thus their performance cannot be analyzed in general scenarios.
In this paper, we approach the problem in a different way
by making the following core observation. Most of the modern
wireless communication standards use phase-shifting modula-
tions that do not fully utilize the wireless channel up to its
Shannon capacity. For example, BPSK and QPSK utilize only
a very limited portion of the I/Q constellation plane, since
information is encoded only on top of the symbols’ phase.
Traditionally, this critical aspect has been leveraged to increase
system throughput by encoding information also on the symbol
amplitude, e.g., as in asymmetric shift keying (ASK) [12].
Conversely, we leverage the additional channel capacity to
implement a covert channel where information is encoded by
changing the amplitude of the primary symbols while keeping
their phase intact.
Fig. 1 shows an example of our pseudo-noise asymmetrical
shift keying (PN-ASK). More in detail, PN-ASK maps each
covert symbol to a radius length of an M -PSK constellation
diagram. Thus, if we define nc as the number of bits per covert
symbol, it follows that Mc = 2nc will be the number of
possible covert symbols, i.e., the number of radii that can be
used to map a different covert symbol. Fig. 1.(b) and Fig. 1.(b)
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Fig. 1. (a) Constellation diagram for 8-PSK; Constellation diagram for PN-
ASK on top of 8-PSK (b) with Mc = 2; (c) with Mc = 4.
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Fig. 2. (a) Transmitted symbols over a 8-PSK constellation; Transmitted
symbols over PN-ASK when (b) Mc = 2; (c) Mc = 4.
show respectively the PN-ASK constellation for Mc = 2 and
Mc = 4, as well as the related bit-to-symbol encoding. For
example, the inner and outer radii in Fig. 1.(b) encode a covert
“0” and “1” with a primary respectively, while the outer radius
in Fig. 1.(c) encodes a covert “10”.
To make an example, let us consider a primary bit sequence
BP = “000111” to be transmitted over 8-PSK. If no covert
communications are needed, the bit sequence would be trans-
mitted by generating two different symbols as shown in Fig.
2.(a). Now, let us assume that the transmitter wants to use PN-
ASK to embed covert data in the ongoing primary communi-
cation. Let us consider the case where Mc = 2, i.e., one bit
is transmitted through each covert channel utilization, and the
covert bit sequence is BC = “10”. Thus, the embedding of
BC in BP would produce the two symbols in the center of Fig.
2. That is, the symbol (000, 1) lies over the external radius of
the constellation. Instead, the symbol (111, 0) is transmitted
by using the inner radius. When Mc = 4, the constellation
shown in Fig. 1.(c) can be used. Thus, to embed the covert bit
sequence BC = {0, 0, 1, 1} in BP , the two symbols (000, 00)
and (111, 11) shown in Fig. 2.(c) are generated and sent.
We point out that the performance of PN-ASK cannot be
analyzed by considering a simple ASK scheme [12]. This PN-
ASK implements two different communication streams (i.e.,
primary and covert), thus the same channel may influence the
covert and primary symbol error rate (SER) in very different
ways. Indeed, Fig. 3 shows an example where we consider a
symbol in the top-right quadrant being transmitted. The covert
symbol is correctly demodulated when it is received inside R1
(yellow shaded) or R3 (orange shaded). However, while in R1
both primary and covert demodulations are successful, inR3 an
error is generated in the primary channel. Instead, if the symbol
is received in R2 or R4, an error is generated in the covert
channel. However, when in R2, the primary symbol is correctly
Fig. 3. Primary/Covert Demodulation Errors in PN-ASK.
demodulated. If the symbol is in R4, both primary and covert
symbol are not correctly demodulated.
In addition to proposing a covert wireless communication
scheme using PN-ASK, we answer the following questions:
Q1: Since the introduction of a covert channel will necessarily
increase the primary channel’s SER, what is the set of
PN-ASK parameters that will yield a desired minimum
primary SER assuming a given channel distribution?
Q2: It is straightforward to notice that PN-ASK will gener-
ate a constellation pattern that slightly differs from the
original primary constellation. Thus, can we assess the
undetectability of the covert transmission as function of
different PN-ASK parameters?
Q3: Can we demonstrate that a practical covert wireless
communication system can use PN-ASK as modulation
scheme? Moreover, is PN-ASK general enough to be
applied to existing standard wireless technologies such as
WiFi?
We address these questions by making the following core
contributions:
• Through rigorous mathematical analysis, in Section IV
we derive closed-form formulas to predict PN-ASK’s SER on
both primary and covert symbols as a function of AWGN noise
(Section IV-A) and fading level (Section IV-B) experienced at
the receiver, as well PN-ASK’s energy per bit (Section IV-C)
and maximum rate achievable (Section IV-D);
• We implement and evaluate the performance on PN-ASK
through extensive simulations and on a testbed composed by
two USRP N210 software-defined radios in two different sce-
narios, and compare PN-ASK’s performance with prior work
[3]. Simulation results confirm that (i) our analytical model
is significantly accurate in predicting PN-ASK’s performance
(Section V-A); and (ii) PN-ASK can trade off performance for
undetectability by changing its parameters (Section V-B). Ex-
perimental results indicate that PN-ASK achieves 8x throughput
than prior work [3] (Section V-E);
•We demonstrate through experiments with an off-the-shelf
WiFi card that PN-ASK-based transmissions can be created on
top of standard-compliant IEEE 802.11 frames without modi-
fying the receiver’s WiFi card firmware/hardware (Section VI).
We believe that this is a unique contribution of this paper that
might open new directions in covert wireless communications.
II. RELATED WORK
The application of steganography to design covert wireless
communication systems has received some attention over the
last few years [13–17]. However, only few works have focused
on the design of general-purpose, efficient and undetectable
covert wireless communication systems.
Classen et al. analyze in [11] different covert channels over
IEEE 802.11 networks, and show that it is feasible to transmit
covert information on top of “redundant” information such as
the short and long training sequences. Similarly, the authors
of [4], [6] and [7] encode covert information by leveraging,
respectively, the cyclic prefix of OFDM symbols, the OFDM
frame padding mechanisms and the redundancy introduced
by error correction coding. Direct sequence spread spectrum
(DSSS) steganography over IEEE 802.15.4 communications
has been investigated in [9], where covert information is ef-
fectively transmitted by intentionally generating errors in the
DSSS sequence. On the other hand, the evaluation is only
theoretical and no experiments on a practical testbed were
conducted. Power allocation over a set of subcarriers is used
in [10] to transmit covert data over AWGN channels. However,
the authors conclude that such an approach achieves zero-rate
transmission when a large number of subcarriers is considered.
The core limitation of the above-mentioned work is that it
is tailored to specific protocols (i.e., WiFi, Bluetooth), thus it
is hardly generalizable and cannot be mathematically analyzed
and optimized. In this paper, we follow a different approach
and do not encode covert information on protocol-specific
features. On the contrary, we leverage an approach only the data
subcarriers involved in the primary data transmission, so as to
(i) improve throughput (since more subcarriers are used), and
(ii) to not disrupt critical information such as synchronization
symbols and cyclic prefixes.
The closest work to ours is [3], where covert information
is modulated onto WiFi QPSK primary symbol so that the
symbols are seen as a “dirty” QPSK modulation at the receiver’s
side (see Fig. 12). However, some design choices in [3] make
the proposed scheme less than fully general. First, the covert
constellations will overlap in case of higher-order modulations
(e.g., 16-QPSK), which inevitably results in throughput loss
in both primary and covert channels. Conversely, we encode
covert information by decreasing the amplitude of a primary
symbol, which does not cause overlap in higher-order modula-
tions. Furthermore, the authors do not offer any mathematical
analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally, we show through ex-
periments in Section V-E that PN-ASK achieves 8x throughput
of [3] under the same conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that
proposes a covert wireless communication system that is (i)
high-throughput and energy-efficient; (ii) extremely flexible
(i.e., to the level of subcarrier allocation); (iii) may be applied
on top of wireless standards such as WiFi without any hardware
modification.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH PN-ASK
The core idea behind our pseudo-noise asymmetric shift
keying (PN-ASK) modulation scheme is that in M -PSK sys-
tems, symbols are equally distributed over the unit circle and
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Fig. 4. Covert modulator and demodulator design.
the information is encoded only in the phase rotation of each
symbol, while the amplitude is always constant and, in general,
unitary. Accordingly, any variation in the amplitude of M -PSK
modulated symbols leaves the information encoded in each M -
PSK symbol intact. The core idea of this paper is to leverage
this peculiar feature of M -PSK modulated signals to establish
a covert channel that encodes hidden data in the variation of
amplitude of the transmitted M-PSK symbols, i.e., the radius of
the M -PSK constellation diagram.
Fig. 4 shows a modulator/demodulator design based on PN-
ASK, which consists of a mapper that translates sequences of
Mc consecutive bits to their corresponding covert symbol s.
The mapping is performed with a coding map, where a bit
combination is associated to one symbol. We define the covert
coding map as follows. Let d be the amplitude variation im-
posed by the covert modulation. For a given index i ∈ [1,Mc],
and a value d, the corresponding i-th element k(i) of the covert
coding map can be defined as
k(i) = 1− (i− 1) · d, 1 ≤ i ≤Mc. (1)
where the condition d ≤ 1/(Mc − 1) must always be satisfied
to guarantee k(i) ≥ 0.
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Fig. 5. Covert constellation diagram for 8-PSK with different values of d (Left:
d = 0.25, Right: d = 0.125).
Fig. 5 depicts the impact of different values of d on the PN-
ASK constellation diagram. From (1), the covert coding map
Sc is defined as Sc = {k(i)}Mci=1. Note that when no covert
information is transmitted, i.e., nc = 0, we have Mc = 20 = 1
and Sc = {1}. Accordingly, in this case only primary data is
transmitted and all transmissions are performed over the unitary
circle.
At the demodulator side, the received baseband signal y
is processed by an amplitude extractor block that computes
s˜ = |y|. Then, the obtained sample s˜ is dispatched to a
quantizer having Mc levels. Each quantization level is used to
map samples to their nearest symbol in Sc. This is achieved by
defining Mc − 1 decision thresholds, which will generate Mc
decision regions. Without loss of generality, we assume that all
covert symbols in Sc are equally likely to be transmitted. In
such case, it is easy to show that the optimal decision thresholds
are
τ(i) =
k(i) + k(i+ 1)
2
(2)
where k(i) is defined in (1). After quantization, the output sˆ
of estimated symbols is then converted to the corresponding
bit sequence by using the same coding map Sc used at the
transmitter’s side.
A. Increasing PN-ASK’s Undetectability
The main concern when implementing a covert wireless
communication scheme is to ensure undetectability of covert
information. Although a very generic, information-theoretical
definition of steganographic undetectability has been proposed
by Cachin in [18], the formal definition of what “undetectable”
means in the context of steganographic wireless communica-
tions is still a (very challenging) open research problem, which
we leave for future work.
Indeed, differently from traditional applications such as im-
age steganography [19], the wireless channel modifies signifi-
cantly the information transmitted, which not only impacts the
primary and covert information (as analyzed in Section IV),
but also the undetectability of the scheme itself. Furthermore, a
receiver eavesdropping the channel for covert communication
may (i) observe the transmission for an arbitrary amount of
time; and (ii) use different measurements to determine whether
covert information is being transmitted, which further compli-
cates the analysis.
From a practical standpoint, we make the observation that a
significantly noisy channel will make the steganographic trans-
mission more undetectable (however, to the detriment of per-
formance). Therefore, we can introduce artificial “noise” in the
transmitted symbols, so as to further confuse an eavesdropper.
An easy way to introduce noise is to transmit the i-th PN-ASK
symbol not exactly at distance k(i) but with a random displace-
ment D ∈ R such that k(i) +D ∈ (max{0, τ(i)},max{τ(i−
1), 2k(i) − τ(i)}) with i = 1, . . . ,Mc. We will show in
Section V-B that this simple addition to PN-ASK increases the
resilience to eavesdroppers.
IV. PN-ASK SYMBOL ERROR RATE ANALYSIS
Let us define the number of coding symbols for the two
channels as M = 2nP and Mc = 2nc , respectively, where
np and nc are the number of bits per symbol in the covert and
primary channels, respectively. We define the respective coding
maps as Sp and Sc.
A. Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) Channel
Let us now consider an AWGN channel. The received signal
is thus y = xc + n = x · s + n, where x ∈ Sp is the
primary transmitted signal, s ∈ Sc is the covert signal and n
represents the AWGN introduced by the channel. We assume
that n is modeled as a circular symmetric complex Gaussian
random variable with variance σ2N , i.e., n ∼ CN (0, σ2n). Let
us first consider the simple case of nc = 1 and fixed distance
d between symbols. From (1), it follows that the coding map is
Sc = {1, 1− d}, with decision threshold τ = {(2− d)/2}. As
explained earlier, the covert demodulator first computes s˜ = |y|
upon reception of signal y. Then, s˜ is quantized to obtain the
quantized symbol sˆ. An error is generated when the quantized
symbol sˆ is different from the transmitted symbol s, i.e., the
symbol error probability (SER) is:
PAWGNc =
∑
s∈Sc
Pr{sˆ 6= s|s sent}Pr{s sent} (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that k = 1 − d and
that all symbols are equally likely to occur. In other words,
Pr{s sent} = 1/Mc for all s ∈ Sc, and (3) can be rewritten
as
PAWGNc =
1
Mc
(Pr{sˆ 6= 1|1 sent}+ Pr{sˆ 6= k|k sent}) (4)
We now derive the two probabilities in (4). We note that a
symbol error is generated when s˜ = |y| is not in the proper
decision region. Thus,
Pr{sˆ 6= 1|1 sent}=Pr{<{y}2 + ={y}2 ≤ τ2|1 sent} (5)
Pr{sˆ 6= k|k sent}=1− Pr{<{y}2+={y}2 ≤ τ2|k sent}
(6)
The above equation is explained as follows. Under the AWGN
assumption, when s = 1 the quantities <{y} and ={y}
can be modeled as two independent normal random variables
(r.v.) with distributions respectively equal to N (xQ, σ2n) and
N (xI , σ2n), where xQ and xI represents the quadrature (Q) and
in-phase (I) components. Thus, (5) can be rewritten as
Pr{sˆ 6= 1|1 sent} = Pr
{
z1 ≤ τ
2
σ2N
∣∣∣1 sent} (7)
with z1 ∼ χ2(2, x2Q/σ2N + x2I/σ2N ) being a non-central Chi-
squared r.v. with 2 degrees of freedom and non-centrality
parameter equal to x2Q/σ
2
N + x
2
I/σ
2
N .
Recall that the noise spectral density of the channel can be
obtained as N0 = 2σ2N , and x
2
Q + x
2
I = ES holds for PSK
signals, thus z1 ∼ χ2(2, 2ES/N0).
Similarly, if s = k, the M-PSK signal is multiplied by 1− d
and <{y} ∼ N (xQ · k, σ2n) and ={y} ∼ N (xI · k, σ2n). Thus,
(6) can be reformulated as
Pr{sˆ 6= k|k sent} = 1− Pr
{
zk ≤ τ
2
σ2N
∣∣∣k sent} (9)
with zk ∼ χ2(2, 2k2ES/N0). The Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of a non-central chi-squared r.v. z with k de-
grees of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ is F (k,λ)Z (t) =
PAWGNc
(
ES
N0
)
=
1
Mc
1−Q1
√2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(1)
N0
+Q1
√2k2(Mc)ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(Mc − 1)
N0
 +
Mc−1∑
i=2
1−Q1
√2k2(i)ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(i)
N0
+Q1
√2k(i)2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(i− 1)
N0
 (8)
1 − Q k
2
(
√
λ,
√
(t)), where QN (α, β) is the generalized Mar-
cum Q-function [20]. It follows that the SER in (3) can be
defined as
PAWGNc =
1
Mc
1−Q1
√2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2
N0

+Q1
√2k2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2
N0
 (10)
Now we derive the SER for the more general case where nc ≥
1. From (1) and (2), in this case we have Sc = {k(i)}Mci=1 and
τ(i) = [k(i) + k(i+ 1)]/2. Thus,
PAWGNc =
1
Mc
1−Q1
√2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(1)
N0

+ Q1
√2k2(Mc)ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(Mc − 1)
N0

+
1
Mc
Mc−1∑
i=2
Pr{sˆ 6= k(i)|k(i) sent} (11)
When i 6= 1 and i 6=Mc,
Pr{sˆ 6=k(i)|k(i) sent}=Pr{<{y}2+={y}2≤τ2(i)|k(i) sent}
+ Pr{<{y}2 + ={y}2 ≥ τ2(i− 1)|k(i) sent}
= Pr{<{y}2 + ={y}2 ≤ τ2(i)|k(i) sent}
+ 1− Pr{<{y}2 + ={y}2 ≤ τ2(i− 1)|k(i) sent} (12)
Similarly to (7) and (9), (12) can be computed as
Pr{sˆ 6= k(i)|k(i) sent}=1−Q1
√2k2(i)ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(i)
N0

+Q1
√2k(i)2ES
N0
,
√
2τ2(i− 1)
N0

(13)
The primary SER can be computed as follows [20]:
PAWGNp =
1
Mc
Mc∑
i=1
PAWGNMPSK
(
k2(i) · ES
N0
)
(14)
where PAWGNMPSK (·) is the SER of a traditional M-PSK modulated
signal under the AWGN regime.
B. Fading over AWGN Channel
Let us now extend the results derived in Section IV-A to the
more general case where fading is considered. In the fading
regime, the received signal can be expressed as y = h·xc+n =
h · x · s + n, where h is a complex channel gain coefficient
that models the fading introduced by channel distortions with
probability density function (p.d.f.) fh(x), x ∈ Sp, s ∈ Sc and
n ∼ CN (0, σ2n). Recall that the SNR per symbol in the fading
regime is γ(FADING)S = |h|2ES/N0 [20]. Thus, we have that
the SER of both covert and primary channels under the fading
regime can be computed as [20]
PFADING =
∫ +∞
0
PAWGN
(
ES
N0
z
)
f|h|2(z)dz (15)
where and f|h|2(·) is the p.d.f. of the r.v. |h|2 that represents
the squared amplitude of the r.v. h and PAWGN(·) is defined
in (11) and (14) for covert and primary channels, respectively.
Note that (15) is general and holds for any p.d.f. f|h|2(·). It is
easy to extend (15) to include the additional random noise D as
discussed in Section III-A.
C. Energy Per Symbol
The average energy per symbol under PN-ASK can be com-
puted as
EcS =
∑
s∈Sc
‖x · s‖2 · Pr{s sent} (16)
Recall that all symbols on the primary channel lies on the
unit circle of the constellation diagram, thus ‖x‖2 = Es for
any x ∈ Sp. Furthermore, since ‖s ·x‖ = s‖x‖ and all symbols
in Sc are equiprobable, (16) can be rewritten as
EcS =
1
Mc
Mc∑
i=1
k2(i)‖x‖2 = ES
Mc
Mc∑
i=1
k2(i) (17)
Since k(i) ≤ 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mc, we have that EcS ≤
ES . That is, the covert modulation produces a reduction in the
energy per symbol of the transmitted symbol. Furthermore, the
energy per symbol decreases as the number nc of covert bits
transmitted over the steganographic channel increases.
On the one hand, this latter result shows that the superim-
position of covert data reduces the energy consumption of the
system. Furthermore, by increasing the amount of covert bits,
the symbol rate increases as well. However, on the other hand,
a reduction in the energy per symbol causes a reduction in the
SNR of the received primary signal, which eventually results in
the generation of errors, and thus a reduction in the achieved
symbol rate on the primary channel.
D. PN-ASK Rate Optimization
From the previous discussions, it follows that PN-ASK can
transmit up to log2(M)+log2(Mc) bits per symbol. In the case
of multiple carrier wireless communications, N · (log2(M) +
log2(Mc)) bits can be transmitted over the channel at each
wireless transmission, where N is the number of subcarriers
used in the system. Theoretically, the achievable bit rate of the
proposed steganographic system is thus equal to
R =
N
Ts
[log2(Mc)(1− BERc) + log2(M)(1− BERp)] ,
(18)
where N is the number of subcarriers used for data transmis-
sion, Ts is the symbol period, and BERc, BERp represent
the bit error rate (BER) of the covert and primary channels,
respectively.
Both BERc and BERp can be derived by using the SER
expressions we have derived in Section IV. Unfortunately, the
relationship between BER and SER strongly depends on the
actual bit coding used for data transmission. As an example,
when Grey coding is used to map bit sequences to symbols,
we have that BER ≈ SER/n, where n is the number of
bit per symbol. However this approximation is not tight for
small values of the ratio Es/N0, which makes it hard to find
closed form expressions for the BER of both primary and covert
channels. For this reason, we will only focus on the SER of PN-
ASK, while we will consider the computation of the BER as out
of the scope of this paper.
The primary and covert symbol rates Rp and Rc (equations
not shown here due to space constraints) not only depend on
the ratio Es/N0, but also on the configuration of both primary
and covert modulation schemes. Thus, to maximize the per-
formance of the system, we define the following optimization
problem.
maximize
M,Mc,d
β ·Rp
(
ES
N0
)
+ (1− β) ·Rc
(
ES
N0
)
(19)
subject to d <
1
Mc − 1 . (20)
where β ∈ [0, 1] trades off primary for covert symbol rates,
and (20) ensures that all covert symbols in Sc are positive, i.e.,
k(i) > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mc.
TABLE I
OPTIMUM PN-ASK SETTING
Es
N0
β = 0.1 β = 0.5 β = 0.9
M Mc d M Mc d M Mc d
0dB 4 4 0.2333 4 4 0.0333 4 4 0.0333
15dB 8 8 0.1286 8 8 0.1000 8 8 0.0143
Table I reports the solution of Problem 19 for different
values of β and Es/N0. The obtained results clearly show
that poor channel conditions require low values of M and
Mc. Conversely, high values of ES/N0 produce higher SNR
levels, which ultimately makes it possible to support higher-
order modulations, i.e., higher values ofM andMc. Table I also
shows that when we primarily focus on the maximization of the
covert channel (i.e., β = 0.1), the distance d increases. This
confirms the theoretical analysis of Section IV. On the other
hand, when higher values of β are considered, the distance d
decreases to accommodate higher SNR values on the primary
channel.
V. PN-ASK EVALUATION
In this section, we report the results obtained by our sim-
ulation study of PN-ASK over AWGN, Rayleigh, Rice, and
log-normal channels [21], which is aimed at validating the
mathematical model proposed in Section IV.
A. PN-ASK Model Validation and SER Performance
Fig. 6 compares the symbol error rate (SER) derived in (11)
and (15) (shown as lines) with the SER obtained by simulation
experiments (shown as point markers), as a function of the
Es/N0 ratio. In our simulations, we fixed the energy per symbol
to Es = 1J and varied N0. Results were averaged over 10, 000
independent runs.
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Fig. 6 shows that our mathematical formulation is accurate
as lines and markers perfectly match. Furthermore, as already
mentioned in Section IV, we conclude that the introduction
of covert data reduces the SNR of the received signal on the
primary channel, ultimately causing an increased SER on the
primary channel. Also, the SER always increases as the number
Mc of covert symbols increases. This is because the distance
between each symbol in Sc decreases asMs and the probability
to incorrectly demodulate symbols increase.
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 0  10  20  30  40
S
E
R
Es/N0 (dB)
Covert Channel
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 0  10  20  30  40
Es/N0 (dB)
Primary Channel
Rayleigh
Rice
Log Normal
AWGN
Fig. 7. Symbol Error Rate as a function of theEs/N0 ratio for different fading
scenarios.
Fig. 7 evaluates PN-ASK under different fading distributions,
where we consider respectively 2 and 4 bit/symbol for primary
and covert transmissions. The results show that the SER always
decreases when large values of the ratio Es/N0 are considered.
Furthermore, Fig. 7 shows that the best performance is achieved
when no fading is considered and only AWGN noise affects
ongoing communications. On the contrary, fading produces
lower SNR values, which eventually results in high values of
the SER.
B. PN-ASK Undetectability Analysis
A key advantage of PN-ASK is its capability to trade off
covert throughput for additional undetectability. As explained
in Section III, PN-ASK achieves this goal by reducing the
distance d between the covert symbols, “camouflaging” the
covert transmission as fading and noise.
To thoroughly evaluate this crucial aspect, the bottom side
of Fig. 8 shows the related primary/covert symbol rate as
function of Es/N0 and d. In these experiments, we consid-
ered a Rayleigh fading channel with σh = 1 and a symbol
time of Ts = 4µs. The symbol rate is computed through
our mathematical model by 1/Ts · (1− SER). For simplicity, we
consider that 2 covert symbols are being sent (i.e., Mc = 2),
which implies that the optimal threshold is set to 1 − d/2. To
produce additional pseudo-noise, the transmitter introduces a
displacements D whose absolute value is uniformly distributed
in (0,min{1− d, d/2}) as explained in Section III-A.
From Fig. 8, we notice that the primary symbol rate increases
as d decreases. On the contrary, the covert symbol rate increases
as higher values of d are considered. This results is reasonable
as when d is large, i.e., d = 0.7, symbols are closer to the origin
and are more likely to change decision region in phase-keyed
modulations, thus generating errors on the primary channel. On
the other hand, as soon as the distance becomes smaller, i.e.,
d = 0.2, symbols become closer with each other and the covert
receiver can decode less covert symbols correctly, hence the
decreased symbol rate on the covert channel.
The impact of the distance d on the undetectability of the
PN-ASK scheme is shown in the top side of Fig. 8, where
we show the pdf of the amplitude of the received (equalized)
symbols, as well as their scatterplot, for different values of d
(respectively 0.7, 0.4, and 0.2). As we can see, as d decreases
the PN-ASK symbols become less evident as they “camouflage”
themselves more and more as a traditional 8-PSK transmission
with additional fading.
C. Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of PN-ASK on two practical
testbeds deployed in an office setting (i.e., in the presence of se-
vere multipath and interference) and in an open hall space (i.e.,
less multipath and interference but further distance between ra-
dios). We also experimentally compare the performance of PN-
ASK with the state-of-the-art work on “dirty constellations” in
[3], henceforth referred to as DTY-PSK. We also evaluate the
undetectability of PN-ASK.
Fig. 9 shows our Office and Hall testbeds, which consist of
two off-the-shelf USRP N210 [22] deployed at about 180cm
and 50 m distance from each other, respectively. Both USRPs
were equipped with (i) one CBX RF transceiver with frequency
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Fig. 9. Office and Hall Experimental Setups.
band from 1.2 GHz to 6 GHz and 40MHz instantaneous band-
width ; and (ii) two VERT2450 dual-band vertical antennas able
to transmit in the ranges 2.4 to 2.48 GHz and 4.9 to 5.9 GHz.
The Office setting was chosen since transmissions were af-
fected by not only severe multipath caused by nearby walls
and other obstacles, but also by interference caused by several
nearby devices transmitting on the industrial, scientific and
medical (ISM) band such as WiFi and Bluetooth. These aspects
make this setup ideal to evaluate the performance of PN-
ASK under challenging channel conditions. The Hall setting
was chosen to evaluate the performance on a scenario with
less interference but with radios communicating over a longer
distance.
To experience different channel conditions, we varied the
sampling rate of the USRP devices; also, to introduce in-
terference from other ISM technologies, we fixed the center
frequency to 2.432 GHz, corresponding to channel 5 of WiFi.
Since WiFi channels are spaced 5 MHz apart with a bandwidth
of approximately 22MHz [23], PN-ASK transmissions received
interference from WiFi channels 3 to 6. Please also note that
our current implementation does not support CSMA/CA and
acknowledgments, thus packet collisions are more likely to
occur.
As far as the PHY layer is concerned, we implemented an
OFDM system with the same parameters (i.e., pilot carriers,
symbols, FFT size, etc) used by WiFi. In particular, our OFDM
subframes are long N = 64 symbols, of which No = 48 are
data, Np = 4 are pilots, and Ng = 12 are guard symbols;
pilot symbols are (1, 1, 1, -1,) and are placed at subcarriers
indexed at (-21, -7, +7, +21) [24]. If not otherwise specified, the
experiments were performed with sampling rate of 0.5 MS/s.
To guarantee reliability, we fixed the modulations used for the
headers to BPSK in case of primary packets and PN-ASK
with 1 bit/sample and d = 0.5 for covert packets – if not
specified otherwise, this is also the modulation for the covert
and primary payloads. In our experiments, covert and primary
applications continuously stream UDP packets encapsulating
bytes read from two different files of approximately 1 MB each.
Payload size (included CRC) for both primary and covert PHY
packets was fixed to 96 bytes (i.e., two OFDM subframes).
D. Throughput Study
Fig. 10 depicts the throughput (expressed in bit/s) experi-
enced by both primary and covert channels, as a function of
the sampling rate (expressed in MS/s) for different modulation
values, in both the Office and Hall scenarios. The results in Fig.
10 indicate that PN-ASK is able to encode covert information
without compromising the primary communication channel.
They also conclude that PN-ASK is able to achieve high-
throughput covert communication, as it is able to deliver a
throughput of about 1.5 Mbit/s on both primary and covert
channels and both settings, despite (i) the adverse channel
conditions; (ii) the lack of CSMA/CA mechanism; (iii) the loss
in performance due to the usage of USRPs (i.e., most of the DSP
implemented in software rather than in hardware); and (iv) the
distance between transmitter and receiver in the Hall setting.
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E. Comparison Study
Fig. 11 shows the experimental comparison between DTY-
PSK and PN-ASK. In a nutshell, the rationale behind DTY-PSK
is to encode covert symbols on top of four QPSK constellations,
each having origin where traditional QPSK symbols are usually
placed, so that the received constellation in interpreted as a
“dirty” QPSK by the receiver. To place the covert symbols,
we used the same parameters as in [3]. Fig. 11 indicates that
PN-ASK exhibits a 6.28x and 8.37x throughput increase with
respect to DTY-PSK in the Office and Hall setups, respectively.
This is because (i) DTY-PSK symbols are placed very closely
to each other (see Fig. 12); and (ii) they are affected by both
amplitude and phase distortion, the DTY-PSK covert channel
exhibits low throughput. Conversely, PN-ASK symbols are
not affected by phase distortion but only by amplitude, which
significantly increases throughput.
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VI. PN-ASK OVER WIFI
To demonstrate the applicability of PN-ASK to widely-
used wireless technologies, we have implemented an additional
version of PN-ASK, named PN-ASK-WiFi, that establishes PN-
ASK-based covert communications on top of standard IEEE
802.11 frames. We have also shot a video demonstration
(demo) of our system, which is available upon request and
was not included here for the sake of anonymity. PN-ASK-
WiFi was implemented by leveraging free-software PHY-layer
Gnuradio libraries of IEEE 802.11 [25]. In our experiments,
the standard receiver was a Dell XPS laptop running Ubuntu
17.10 and equipped with an off-the-shelf Intel Dual-Band
Wireless-AC 7265NGW wireless card [26]. On the transmit-
ter’s side, we have implemented a primary application broad-
casting a WiFi frame every 5 milliseconds for 5 minutes,
with source and destination MAC addresses 23:23:23:23:23:23
and 42:42:42:42:42:42. The frame’s payload has been set
to the string This is a message on the primary
channel!, whereas MAC addresses are 25:25:25:25:25:25
and 43:43:43:43:43:43, respectively, with payload set to the
string This is a covert message!.
Fig. 13. (left) Wireshark screenshot on the WiFi-equipped laptop; (right)
Decoded covert WiFi frames.
Our PN-ASK-WiFi system sends WiFi frames without the
need to associate with an access point (AP). For this reason,
we have used the airmon-ng and iwconfig tools to put the
WiFi card in monitor mode and thus receive any IEEE 802.11
frame transmitted on a given channel. Similar to the previous
experiments, WiFi frames are transmitted on channel 5 (2.432
GHz). However, to be WiFi-compatible, in these experiments
the bandwidth has been set to 20 MHz. To visualize the WiFi
frames received on channel 5 by the laptop, we have used the
widely used Wireshark tool. Covert frames are instead re-
ceived by an iMac desktop equipped with an USRP N210. The
left side of Fig. 13 shows a screenshot of the Wireshark capture.
As it can be observed, primary frames are received correctly by
the laptop’s WiFi card, whose hardware and software was not
modified in any shape or form.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has presented a novel pseudo-noise amplitude
shift keying (PN-ASK) modulation scheme to implement covert
wireless communication systems. First, we have provided
a real-world OFDM-based implementation of PN-ASK, and
mathematically analyzed the symbol error rate (SER) of PN-
ASK. Then, we have evaluated PN-ASK on USRP N210 soft-
ware radios, and shown that PN-ASK achieves a throughput of
about 1.5 Mbit/s on both covert and primary data streams, on
a channel only 2.5 MHz wide and in the presence of severe
interference from nearby ISM band transmissions, and that
PN-ASK increases the covert throughput by more than 8x
with respect to the state of the art. Furthermore, results have
shown that PN-ASK is almost undetectable. Finally, we have
demonstrated that PN-ASK can be used to transmit covert data
on top of standard IEEE 802.11 frames, which are correctly
decoded by the WiFi card without any hardware modifications.
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